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CLD-194    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                
No. 06-4854
                                
ZOE AJJAHNON,
            Appellant
   v.
THE STATE; THERESA M. RUSSO.
                                                                            
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-03693)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
                                                                              
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
April 12, 2007
Before: RENDELL, SMITH AND JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: April 23, 2007)
                                            
OPINION
                                            
PER CURIAM
Zoe Ajjahnon, a resident of Saddle River, New Jersey, appeals from the district
court’s order dismissing her complaint as frivolous.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I);
1  This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Further, our review of the district court’s dismissal order is plenary.  See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).  For the following reasons, we will likewise dismiss
Ajjahnon’s appeal. 
A detailed account of the facts underlying Ajjahnon’s claims is unnecessary.  In
her complaint, Ajjahnon asked the district court to overturn the decision of a New Jersey
state court judge entered on May 28, 2003, and affirmed by the Superior Court of New
Jersey Appellate Division on July 11, 2006.  According to Ajjahnon’s complaint, and the
contents of its numerous accompanying exhibits, the state court entered judgment against
Ajjahnon, and in favor of the above-named Theresa M. Russo, as a result of a landlord-
tenant dispute.  After the state appeals process concluded, Ajjahnon filed a complaint, in
forma pauperis, with the district court on August 8, 2006.  Ajjahnon alleged she was
denied due process as a result of the state courts’ decisions and that the state courts had
violated her civil rights in ruling against her.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  On August 22, 2006,
the district court entered an opinion holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
Ajjahnon’s claims.  On that same day, the district court entered an order dismissing
Ajjahnon’s complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  After the district
court later denied Ajjahnon’s timely motion for reconsideration, Ajjahnon filed a timely
notice of appeal.1
The district court correctly held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
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Ajjahnon’s claims.  Although not cited as authority by the district court, the familiar
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable here.  See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); see also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).  “The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction in some circumstances to
review a state court adjudication.”  Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449
F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006).  Generally, “[u]nder the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower
federal courts cannot entertain constitutional claims that have been previously adjudicated
in state court or that are inextricably intertwined with a state adjudication.”  Whiteford v.
Reed, 155 F.3d 671, 674 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Gulla v. N. Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d
168, 170 (3d Cir. 1998)).  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine thus “precludes a federal action
if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state decision or
void its ruling.”  Id. (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny County Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d
834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996)).  In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005), the United States Supreme Court clarified the scope of
Rooker-Feldman, making clear that the doctrine deprives a district court of subject matter
jurisdiction only in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 
In her complaint and notice of appeal, Ajjahnon explicitly and exclusively alleges
injuries suffered from previous state court judgments and seeks as a remedy a reversal or
modification of those judgments.  Thus, Ajjahnon’s federal action is the classic case of
-4-
the proper application of Rooker-Feldman as set forth in Exxon Mobil.  While a review of
these state court decisions may possibly be had in the Supreme Court, review may not be
had under the guise of a § 1983 complaint filed in federal district court.  See Verizon Md.,
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644, n.3 (2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and
does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court
judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see [28 U.S.C.] § 1257(a).”); see
also Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992).
Given our preceding discussion, we agree with the district court that there was no
need to provide Ajjahnon with an opportunity to further amend her complaint because
any amendment would have proven futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that amendment “must be permitted . . . unless it
would be inequitable or futile”).  Accordingly, as Ajjahnon’s appeal is entirely lacking in
merit, we will dismiss it under  § 1915(e)(2)(B).
